codesanitize

Constructing an AI Picture Recognition App Utilizing Google Gemini and SwiftUI

iOS Development

codesanitize

21 August 2024

Constructing an AI Picture Recognition App Utilizing Google Gemini and SwiftUI

Beforehand, we offered a transient introduction to Google Gemini APIs and demonstrated methods to construct a Q&A software utilizing SwiftUI. It is best to notice how simple it’s to combine Google Gemini and improve your apps with AI options. We’ve additionally developed a demo software to exhibit methods to assemble a chatbot app utilizing the AI APIs.

The gemini-pro mannequin mentioned within the earlier tutorial is proscribed to producing textual content from text-based enter. Nevertheless, Google Gemini additionally provides a multimodal mannequin known as gemini-pro-vision, which might generate textual content descriptions from photographs. In different phrases, this mannequin has the capability to detect and describe objects in a picture.

On this tutorial, we are going to exhibit methods to use Google Gemini APIs for picture recognition. This easy app permits customers to pick a picture from their photograph library and makes use of Gemini to explain the contents of the photograph.

Earlier than continuing with this tutorial, please go to Google AI Studio and create your individual API key for those who haven’t achieved so already.

Including Google Generative AI Package deal in Xcode Tasks

Assuming you’ve already created an app undertaking in Xcode, step one to utilizing Gemini APIs is importing the SDK. To perform this, right-click on the undertaking folder within the undertaking navigator and choose Add Package deal Dependencies. Within the dialog field, enter the next package deal URL:

https://github.com/google/generative-ai-swift

You possibly can then click on on the Add Package deal button to obtain and incorporate the GoogleGenerativeAI package deal into the undertaking.

Subsequent, to retailer the API key, create a property file named GeneratedAI-Data.plist. On this file, create a key named API_KEY and enter your API key as the worth.

To learn the API key from the property file, create one other Swift file named APIKey.swift. Add the next code to this file:

enum APIKey {
  // Fetch the API key from `GenerativeAI-Data.plist`
  static var `default`: String {

    guard let filePath = Bundle.major.path(forResource: "GenerativeAI-Data", ofType: "plist")
    else {
      fatalError("Could not discover file 'GenerativeAI-Data.plist'.")
    }

    let plist = NSDictionary(contentsOfFile: filePath)

    guard let worth = plist?.object(forKey: "API_KEY") as? String else {
      fatalError("Could not discover key 'API_KEY' in 'GenerativeAI-Data.plist'.")
    }

    if worth.begins(with: "_") {
      fatalError(
        "Observe the directions at https://ai.google.dev/tutorials/setup to get an API key."
      )
    }

    return worth
  }
}

Constructing the App UI

The person interface is easy. It contains a button on the backside of the display screen, permitting customers to entry the built-in Picture library. After a photograph is chosen, it seems within the picture view.

To carry up the built-in Photographs library, we use PhotosPicker, which is a local photograph picker view for managing photograph picks. When presenting the PhotosPicker view, it showcases the photograph album in a separate sheet, rendered atop your app’s interface.

First, that you must import the PhotosUI framework with a view to use the photograph picker view:

import PhotosUI

Subsequent, replace the ContentView struct like this to implement the person interface:

struct ContentView: View {

    @State non-public var selectedItem: PhotosPickerItem?
    @State non-public var selectedImage: Picture?

    var physique: some View {
        VStack {

            if let selectedImage {
                selectedImage
                    .resizable()
                    .scaledToFit()
                    .clipShape(RoundedRectangle(cornerRadius: 20.0))
            } else {

                Picture(systemName: "photograph")
                    .imageScale(.massive)
                    .foregroundStyle(.grey)
                    .body(maxWidth: .infinity, maxHeight: .infinity)
                    .background(Colour(.systemGray6))
                    .clipShape(RoundedRectangle(cornerRadius: 20.0))
            }

            Spacer()

            PhotosPicker(choice: $selectedItem, matching: .photographs) {
                Label("Choose Picture", systemImage: "photograph")
                    .body(maxWidth: .infinity)
                    .daring()
                    .padding()
                    .foregroundStyle(.white)
                    .background(.indigo)
                    .clipShape(RoundedRectangle(cornerRadius: 20.0))
            }
        }
        .padding(.horizontal)
        .onChange(of: selectedItem) { oldItem, newItem in
            Job {
                if let picture = strive? await newItem?.loadTransferable(kind: Picture.self) {
                    selectedImage = picture
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

To make use of the PhotosPicker view, we declare a state variable to retailer the photograph choice after which instantiate a PhotosPicker view by passing the binding to the state variable. The matching parameter lets you specify the asset kind to show.

When a photograph is chosen, the photograph picker mechanically closes, storing the chosen photograph within the selectedItem variable of kind PhotosPickerItem. The loadTransferable(kind:completionHandler:) technique can be utilized to load the picture. By attaching the onChange modifier, you’ll be able to monitor updates to the selectedItem variable. If there’s a change, we invoke the loadTransferable technique to load the asset knowledge and save the picture to the selectedImage variable.

As a result of selectedImage is a state variable, SwiftUI mechanically detects when its content material adjustments and shows the picture on the display screen.

Picture Evaluation and Object Recognition

Having chosen a picture, the following step is to make use of the Gemini APIs to carry out picture evaluation and generate a textual content description from the picture.

Earlier than utilizing the APIs, insert the next assertion on the very starting of ContentView.swift to import the framework:

import GoogleGenerativeAI

Subsequent, declare a mannequin property to carry the AI mannequin:

let mannequin = GenerativeModel(identify: "gemini-pro-vision", apiKey: APIKey.default)

For picture evaluation, we make the most of the gemini-pro-vision mannequin offered by Google Gemini. Then, we declare two state variables: one for storing the generated textual content and one other for monitoring the evaluation standing.

@State non-public var analyzedResult: String?
@State non-public var isAnalyzing: Bool = false

Subsequent, create a brand new operate named analyze() to carry out picture evaluation:

@MainActor func analyze() {

    self.analyzedResult = nil
    self.isAnalyzing.toggle()

    // Convert Picture to UIImage
    let imageRenderer = ImageRenderer(content material: selectedImage)
    imageRenderer.scale = 1.0

    guard let uiImage = imageRenderer.uiImage else {
        return
    }

    let immediate = "Describe the picture and clarify what the objects discovered within the picture"

    Job {
        do {
            let response = strive await mannequin.generateContent(immediate, uiImage)

            if let textual content = response.textual content {
                print("Response: (textual content)")
                self.analyzedResult = textual content
                self.isAnalyzing.toggle()
            }
        } catch {
            print(error.localizedDescription)
        }
    }
}

Earlier than utilizing the mannequin’s API, we have to convert the picture view into an UIImage. We then invoke the generateContent technique with the picture and a predefined immediate, asking Google Gemini to explain the picture and determine the objects inside it.

When the response arrives, we extract the textual content description and assign it to the analyzedResult variable.

Subsequent, insert the next code and place it above the Spacer() view:

ScrollView {
    Textual content(analyzedResult ?? (isAnalyzing ? "Analyzing..." : "Choose a photograph to get began"))
        .font(.system(.title2, design: .rounded))
}
.padding()
.body(maxWidth: .infinity, maxHeight: .infinity, alignment: .main)
.background(Colour(.systemGray6))
.clipShape(RoundedRectangle(cornerRadius: 20.0))

This scroll view shows the textual content generated by Gemini. Optionally, you’ll be able to add an overlay modifier to the selectedImage view. This can show a progress view whereas a picture evaluation is being carried out.

.overlay {

    if isAnalyzing {
        RoundedRectangle(cornerRadius: 20.0)
            .fill(.black)
            .opacity(0.5)

        ProgressView()
            .tint(.white)
    }
}

After implementing all of the adjustments, the preview pane ought to now be displaying a newly designed person interface. This interface contains of the chosen picture, the picture description space, and a button to pick images from the photograph library. That is what you need to see in your preview pane if all of the steps have been adopted and executed appropriately.

Lastly, insert a line of code within the onChange modifier to name the analyze() technique after the selectedImage. That’s all! Now you can take a look at the app within the preview pane. Click on on the Choose Picture button and select a photograph from the library. The app will then ship the chosen photograph to Google Gemini for evaluation and show the generated textual content within the scroll view.

Abstract

The tutorial demonstrates methods to construct an AI picture recognition app utilizing Google Gemini APIs and SwiftUI. The app permits customers to pick a picture from their photograph library and makes use of Gemini to explain the contents of the photograph.

From the code we have now simply labored on, you’ll be able to see that it solely requires a number of traces to immediate Google Gemini to generate textual content from a picture. Though this demo illustrates the method utilizing a single picture, the API truly helps a number of photographs. For additional particulars on the way it capabilities, please consult with the official documentation.

The faucet-estry of threats concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers

Hacking

codesanitize

20 August 2024

The faucet-estry of threats concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers

Prior to now few months, the Telegram clicker sport Hamster Kombat has taken the world of cryptocurrency sport fans by storm. Though the gameplay, which largely entails repeatedly tapping the display screen of 1’s cellular system, may be reasonably easy, gamers are after one thing extra: the potential for incomes massive as soon as Hamster Kombat’s creators unveil the promised new cryptocoin tied to the sport.

Because of its success, the sport has already attracted numerous copycats that replicate its identify and icon, and have comparable gameplay. Fortunately, all of the early examples we discovered weren’t malicious, however nonetheless intention to make cash from in-app ads.

Sadly, ESET researchers found that cybercriminals have additionally began to capitalize on Hamster Kombat’s reputation. Exposing the dangers of attempting to acquire video games and associated software program from unofficial sources, we discovered a number of threats abusing Hamster Kombat’s fame in such locations as remotely managed Android malware distributed by way of an unofficial Hamster Kombat Telegram channel, pretend app shops that ship undesirable ads, and GitHub repositories distributing Lumma Stealer for Home windows gadgets whereas claiming to supply automation instruments for the sport.

Key factors of the blogpost:

Hamster Kombat’s success has attracted malicious actors attempting to abuse curiosity within the sport for financial acquire.

ESET researchers found Android spyware and adware named Ratel pretending to be Hamster Kombat, distributed by way of an unofficial Telegram channel.

Android customers are additionally focused by pretend app shops claiming to supply the sport however delivering undesirable ads as an alternative.

Home windows customers can encounter GitHub repositories providing farm bots and auto clickers that really include Lumma Stealer cryptors.

What’s Hamster Kombat?

Hamster Kombat is an in-app Telegram clicker sport the place the gamers earn fictional forex by finishing easy duties, with incentives to log into the sport no less than day by day. As in different cellular clicker video games, the essential gameplay of Hamster Kombat entails tapping the display screen repeatedly to attain extra in-game factors. A screenshot illustrating the sport’s interface will be seen in Determine 1.

Figure 1. In-game screenshot of Hamster Kombat — *Determine 1. In-game screenshot of Hamster Kombat*

Launched in March 2024, Hamster Kombat appears to be gaining in reputation fairly rapidly. In June 2024, the builders claimed that their sport had already managed to achieve 150 million energetic customers. Seeing as this could put Hamster Kombat – a sport aimed simply on the cryptocurrency fanatic subset of cellular avid gamers, and accessible solely by way of Telegram – within the prime 20 most-played cellular video games of all time, the declare ought to be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, the sport is undoubtedly widespread: the official Hamster Kombat account on X has greater than 10 million followers, and the Hamster Kombat Announcement channel has greater than 50 million subscribers as of the publication of this blogpost.

Unsurprisingly, the primary motive behind the quickly rising curiosity in Hamster Kombat is the gamers’ need to earn cash by taking part in the sport: Hamster Kombat’s improvement roadmap consists of plans for launching a brand new cryptocoin token tied to the sport. The token ought to subsequently be distributed to the gamers based mostly on assembly sure standards, a method also called an airdrop.

The crew behind Hamster Kombat appears to be attempting to copy the success of one other Telegram-based sport known as Notcoin, which in Might 2024 launched the NOT token on Telegram’s blockchain platform The Open Community (TON) and airdropped it to the gamers based mostly on their in-game scores. NOT token’s launch was very profitable, with some claiming it was the largest crypto-gaming-token launch of 2024 thus far.

The Hamster Kombat token drop can be supposed to make use of the TON community. Versus Notcoin, nonetheless, the variety of tokens obtained will not rely on complete rating however on different components, comparable to profit-per-hour.

Risk evaluation

As was to be anticipated, the success of Hamster Kombat has additionally introduced out cybercriminals, who’ve already began to deploy malware concentrating on the gamers of the sport. ESET Analysis has uncovered threats going after each Android and Home windows customers. Android customers are focused by spyware and adware and faux app shops stuffed with undesirable ads, whereas Home windows customers can encounter GitHub repositories with Lumma Stealer cryptors.

As any undertaking promising earnings for little effort, the sport itself can be on the radar of cybersecurity specialists and authorities officers, who’re warning of potential monetary dangers concerned in taking part in. Thus far, ESET has not seen any malicious exercise from the unique app.

Android threats

We recognized and analyzed two kinds of threats concentrating on Android customers: a malicious app that incorporates the Android spyware and adware Ratel and faux web sites that impersonate app retailer interfaces claiming to have Hamster Kombat accessible for obtain.

Ratel spyware and adware

ESET researchers discovered a Telegram channel (https://t[.]me/hamster_easy) distributing Android spyware and adware, named Ratel, disguised as Hamster Kombat; see Determine 2.

Figure 2. HAMSTER EASY Telegram channel sharing the malicious app — *Determine 2. HAMSTER EASY Telegram channel sharing the malicious app; the message with the app obtain highlighted with a blue rectangle*

This malware is able to stealing notifications and sending SMS messages. The malware operators use this performance to pay for subscriptions and companies with the sufferer’s funds with out the sufferer noticing.

Whereas the malicious app misuses the identify Hamster Kombat to draw potential victims, it incorporates no performance discovered throughout the sport and even lacks a person interface altogether. As displayed in Determine 3, upon startup, the app requests notification entry permission, and asks to be set because the default SMS software. As soon as these permissions are granted, the malware will get entry to all SMS messages and is ready to intercept all displayed notifications.

Figure 3. Malicious Hamster Kombat access requests — *Determine 3. Malicious Hamster Kombat entry requests*

Ratel then initiates communication with its C&C server (http://77.91.124[.]14:260), and as a response, receives a cellphone quantity: see Determine 4. Afterwards, it sends an SMS message with the textual content Привет! Набери мне: logID (translation: Hi there! Name me) to the that cellphone quantity, which most probably belongs to the malware operators.

Figure 4. Network communication — *Determine 4. Community communication*

The risk actors then turn into able to controlling the compromised system by way of SMS: the operator message can include a textual content to be despatched to a specified quantity, and even instruct the system to name the quantity. The malware can be capable of test the sufferer’s present banking account stability for Sberbank Russia by sending a message with the textual content баланс (translation: stability) to the quantity 900. That is most likely carried out with a view to determine whether or not the operators ought to pursue additional assault situations to entry the sufferer’s funds.

Ratel additionally abuses notification entry permissions to cover notifications from over 200 apps based mostly on a hardcoded record (see the Appendix for the whole record). The record incorporates apps comparable to Telegram, WhatsApp, and several other SMS messaging apps. If the affected system receives a notification from an app on the record, the sufferer will be unable to see it. Hiding is the one motion the malware does with these notifications; they aren’t forwarded to the C&C server. Almost definitely, the aim of intercepting the notifications is to stop the sufferer from discovering affirmation messages despatched by subscription companies.

As proven in Determine 5, in case there’s a notification from an app not included within the record, Ratel lets the person see it, whereas additionally forwarding it to the C&C server. We expect this may be carried out in order that the operators can test whether or not a brand new app must be added to the record.

Figure 5. Notification exfiltrated to C&C server — *Determine 5. Notification exfiltrated to C&C server*

Pretend web sites

In addition to the app with the Ratel spyware and adware, we additionally found pretend software storefronts claiming to supply Hamster Kombat for obtain. Nonetheless, tapping the Set up or Open buttons solely leads the person to undesirable ads. Examples of the pretend web sites will be present in Determine 6.

Figure 6. Fake websites impersonating an app store interface — *Determine 6. Pretend web sites impersonating an app retailer interface*

Home windows threats

Though Hamster Kombat is a cellular sport, we additionally discovered malware abusing the sport’s identify to unfold on Home windows. Cybercriminals attempt to entice Home windows customers with auxiliary instruments that declare to make maximizing in-game income simpler for the gamers. Our analysis revealed GitHub repositories (see Determine 7) providing Hamster Kombat farm bots and autoclickers, that are instruments that automate clicks in a sport. These repositories really turned out to hide cryptors from the notorious Lumma Stealer malware.

Figure 7. Example GitHub repository spreading Lumma Stealer via an “offer” for a farm bot — *Determine 7. Instance GitHub repository spreading Lumma Stealer by way of an “provide” for a farm bot (with out supply code)*

Lumma Stealer is an infostealer supplied as malware-as-a-service, accessible for buy on the darkish net and on Telegram. First noticed in 2022, this malware is usually distributed by way of pirated software program and spam, and targets cryptocurrency wallets, person credentials, two-factor authentication browser extensions, and different delicate data. Notice that Lumma Stealer’s capabilities should not lined by the MITRE ATT&CK matrix on this blogpost, for the reason that focus is on the cryptors that ship this infostealer, not on the infostealer itself.

The GitHub repositories we discovered both had the malware accessible instantly within the launch recordsdata, or contained hyperlinks to obtain it from exterior file-sharing companies. We recognized three totally different variations of Lumma Stealer cryptors lurking throughout the repositories: C++ purposes, Go purposes, and Python purposes. Of the three, solely the Python purposes have a graphical person interface (GUI).

C++ purposes

Within the case of the C++ purposes, Lumma Stealer is encrypted by way of the RC4 cipher and embedded within the executable the sufferer downloads. As soon as executed, the applying injects Lumma Stealer into the newly created course of C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFrameworkv4.0.30319RegAsm.exe.

Go purposes

For the Go purposes, Lumma Stealer can be embedded within the executable, however this time, it’s encrypted utilizing AES-GCM. The cryptor makes use of copied and obfuscated code from go_libpeconv, a Go library for loading PE recordsdata, to do course of hollowing on the primary file discovered with the .exe extension beneath the C:Home windows listing.

Python purposes

The Python purposes have been both bundled with PyInstaller or compiled with Nuitka. When the sufferer runs the file downloaded from the GitHub repository, a pretend installer window with an I agree button seems, as will be seen in Determine 8. Upon clicking the button, this system connects to an FTP server and downloads a password-protected ZIP archive (password: crypto123) containing the cryptor with Lumma Stealer embedded. We discovered C++ and Go cryptors on the FTP server, which leads us to the conclusion that these purposes are in all probability totally different variations of the identical malware household.

Figure 8. Fake installer window — *Determine 8. Pretend installer window*

As soon as the window is closed, the cryptor sends the C&C server the timestamps of when the sufferer clicked on the I agree button and when the malware was run. This information is distributed solely as soon as and there’s no additional C&C communication involving the cryptor. As proven in Determine 9, we discovered a remark report back to telegramm [sic] within the Python supply code of the malware, which means that in all probability the information is distributed from the C&C to the operators’ Telegram account or channel in some unspecified time in the future.

Figure 9. Python code — Determine 9. Python code that shops the time when the malware was run (right into a dictionary as a string), apparently to be reported by way of Telegram, in keeping with the remark (machine translation: Bot opened)

Conclusion

Hamster Kombat’s reputation makes it ripe for abuse, which implies that it’s extremely probably that the sport will appeal to extra malicious actors sooner or later. Whereas many copycat Hamster Kombat apps look like malware-free, we found a remotely managed trojan distributed by way of Telegram disguised as the sport. The malware is able to sending SMS messages, making calls, and concealing its actions by hiding notifications which may recommend the system is compromised. Aside from the Android trojan, we additionally discovered pretend app shops claiming to supply Hamster Kombat for obtain; the hyperlinks, nonetheless, usually result in undesirable ads. Lastly, on the Home windows platform, we uncovered GitHub repositories that lure avid gamers in with the promise of Hamster Kombat farm bots and autoclickers however that, in actuality, serve the victims with cryptors containing Lumma Stealer.

Due to Anton Cherepanov for his contributions.

For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com

ESET Analysis presents non-public APT intelligence stories and information feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Risk Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete record of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and samples will be present in our GitHub repository.

Information

SHA-1	Filename	Detection	Description
ACD260356E3337F775E1 AA6259B55E2D3BB11F80	Hamster.apk	Android/Spy.Ratel.A	Android malware impersonating Hamster Kombat.
C51266A3F60984897645 79C4A62B8509249F00E5	Setup.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HWZI	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
7BE8D85301C9CCE39455 61878C924908A8E1F714	Hamster-Kombat.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXDB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
91351285CB1448D22C88 3BC9DC1273CA46E3C90A	replace.exe	WinGo/TrojanDropper. Agent.CW	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
46A83FBCF1AA068C8F6C 46AE239ABE968094E0ED	Setup_v1.1.2.exe	WinGo/TrojanDropper. Agent.CW	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
2B17E3A93A59E4F9350F EF831456C9F02ACF9A75	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXIB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
9DEB6D5E9209A9EC2B8D 12972225B6A2166387EA	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXIB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
16B815C14941ECFE164B DF074F47817DCB90CCBF	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXIB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
2E257D5ABB0E76AB57A0 D6AE470340F71738480F	Open.exe	WinGo/Agent.VY	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
78F1B8C6087348EC83B7 F85EEFDEEC5DB506D851	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXIB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
6F14278BC5DEA7803C9D 3780BCA2BDB63A854F16	AUTOCLICKER.exe	Win32/GenKryptik.GXGC	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
812799738C18ACB88D5C 9987CBFBB678C35142D8	HAMSTER KOMBAT BALANCE HACK.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXDV	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
B11B1CD89EA5F0D562D1 8278278EE247B18190E9	Hamster-Kombat-NEW.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXCA	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
FE51C824245FFE8CB509 B73C25CDF02871A38F1A	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXIB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
592215355FB25521FD76 64B9EC017B1CA2FEA73B	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXDB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
92B028A302FAA31BDB78 8DA3C511983AD5B08084	replace.exe	Win32/Kryptik.HXDB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
12B0BD4B2F1EB173B782 B98C89BA6880C6F88056	Run.exe	Python/TrojanDownloader. Agent.AFC	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
3021E974D78544E62F43 E5E0059EBC879594E55C	Set up.exe	Python/TrojanDownloader. Agent.AFB	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.
F79C575D0D887427B7B3 8ECBFB42046270FB89E8	Run.exe	Python/TrojanDownloader. Agent.AFC	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers.

Community

IP	Area	Internet hosting supplier	First seen	Particulars
77.91.124[.]14	N/A	Daniil Yevchenko	2024‑05‑11	Android/Spy.Ratel.A C&C server.
76.76.21[.]164	www.hamsterkombat‑ua [.]professional	Amazon.com, Inc.	2024‑06‑08	Pretend web site.
172.67.159[.]114	hamsterkombat‑win [.]professional	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑13	Pretend web site.
N/A	www.hamster‑ua[.]professional	N/A	2024‑06‑10	Pretend web site.
N/A	www.ua‑hamster‑kombat [.]professional	N/A	2024‑06‑04	Pretend web site.
N/A	www.hamster‑kombat‑ua [.]professional	N/A	2024‑06‑04	Pretend web site.
N/A	www.hamstercasino‑ua‑on [.]professional	N/A	2024‑06‑16	Pretend web site.
104.21.86[.]106	incredibleextedwj [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑04‑13	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.11[.]250	productivelookewr [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑04‑14	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.89[.]202	tolerateilusidjukl [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑04‑13	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.95[.]19	shatterbreathepsw [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑04‑13	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.76[.]102	detailbaconroollyws [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑26	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.74[.]118	horsedwollfedrwos [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑26	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.55[.]248	patternapplauderw [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑26	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.22[.]94	understanndtytonyguw [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑26	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.63[.]189	liabiliytshareodlkv [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑07	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.74[.]169	notoriousdcellkw [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑07	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.59[.]152	conferencefreckewl [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑07	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.76[.]157	flourhishdiscovrw [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑07	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.71[.]242	meltedpleasandtws [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑30	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.53[.]89	varianntyfeecterd [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑25	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.16[.]251	snaillymarriaggew [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑06‑12	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.62[.]244	thidrsorebahsufll [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑29	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.75[.]100	distincttangyflippan [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑30	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.30[.]167	greentastellesqwm [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑29	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.28[.]32	considerrycurrentyws [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑26	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.92[.]10	corruptioncrackywosp [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑17	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.52[.]185	negotitatiojdsuktoos [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑18	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.32[.]80	museumtespaceorsp [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑18	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.76[.]185	stickyyummyskiwffe [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑29	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
104.21.26[.]6	vivaciousdqugilew [.]store	Cloudflare, Inc.	2024‑05‑29	Lumma Stealer C&C server.
146.19.207[.]14	N/A	Cloud Internet hosting Options, Restricted.	N/A	Home windows malware concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers C&C server.

Code-signing certificates

Serial quantity	0997C56CAA59055394D9A9CDB8BEEB56
Thumbprint	15F760D82C79D22446CC7D4806540BF632B1E104
Topic CN	NVIDIA Company
Topic O	NVIDIA Company
Topic L	Santa Clara
Topic S	N/A
Topic C	US
Legitimate from	2023-01-13 00:00:00
Legitimate to	2026-01-16 23:59:59

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk was constructed utilizing model 15 of the MITRE ATT&CK cellular methods.

Tactic	ID	Title	Description
Preliminary Entry	T1660	Phishing	Android spyware and adware Ratel has been distributed utilizing an unofficial Telegram channel.
Persistence	T1624.001	Occasion Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers	Android spyware and adware Ratel registers to obtain the SMS_RECEIVED, SMS_DELIVER, PACKAGE_REMOVED, PACKAGE_REPLACED, PACKAGE_ADDED, and PACKAGE_CHANGE broadcast intents to activate itself.
Assortment	T1517	Entry Notifications	Android spyware and adware Ratel can acquire messages from numerous apps.
Command and Management	T1644	Out of Band Knowledge	Android spyware and adware Ratel can use SMS to obtain instructions to execute.
Exfiltration	T1646	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Android spyware and adware Ratel exfiltrates information utilizing HTTP.
Affect	T1616	Name Management	Android spyware and adware Ratel could make cellphone calls.
Affect	T1582	SMS Management	Android spyware and adware Ratel can ship and obtain SMS messages.

This desk was constructed utilizing model 15 of the MITRE ATT&CK cellular methods.

Tactic	ID	Title	Description
Protection Evasion	T1027.009	Obfuscated Information or Data: Embedded Payloads	Lumma Stealer makes use of C++ and Go binaries to embed its payload.
Protection Evasion	T1055.012	Course of Injection: Course of Hollowing	Lumma Stealer makes use of course of hollowing.
Command and Management	T1071.001	Software Layer Protocol: Net Protocols	Lumma Stealer communicates with the C&C server by way of HTTP
Command and Management	T1071.002	Software Layer Protocol: File Switch Protocols	Lumma Stealer downloader makes use of FTP to obtain the payload.
Exfiltration	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Lumma Stealer exfiltrates the sufferer’s information to the C&C server.

Appendix

Following is the record of purposes from which the Ratel malware hides notifications:

com.android.incallui

com.texter.voxuedigital

com.zeopoxa.health.biking.bike

com.coloros.gallery3d

com.whatsapp

applock.lockapps.fingerprint.password.lockit

com.playrix.township

ru.yandex.taximeter

notification

com.google.android.apps.wellbeing

com.rstgames.durak

com.duolingo

com.blinkmap

limehd.ru.ctv

com.google.android.packageinstaller

com.dreamy.display screen.plot

cn.baos.watch.w100

com.sec.android.gallery3d

pedometer.stepcounter.calorieburner.
pedometerforwalking

com.fb.lite

com.transsnet.retailer

ru.auto.ara

weata.taxi

com.samsung.android.sport.gamehome

com.mazegame.notpopsong.popmaze

ru.mail.cloud

com.sec.android.app.shealth

in.sweatco.app

ru.yandex.yandexnavi

com.yandex.searchapp.beta

ru.mail.mailapp

com.fb.katana

com.samsung.android.scloud

uz.kundalik.cellular

com.relaxplayer.android

com.sh.good.caller

ru.aalab.androidapp.uamp.
app58cbb075e7ee62000602fe37

com.mediatek.simprocessor

com.allstarunion.myths

com.google.android.setupwizard

com.mediatek.callrecorder

com.android.updater

nevada.dos.governor

com.uznewmax.theflash

com.app.champion.professional

dev.ragnarok.fenrir_public

com.desktop.genius.spote

com.snaptube.premium

com.android.suppliers.downloads

com.sec.android.app.sbrowser

com.mytube.floatviewer2

com.google.android.dialer

com.samsung.android.sport.gametools

com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox

com.google.android.apps.messaging

com.google.android.youtube

com.xiaomi.hm.well being

com.correct.climate.forecast.stay

yo.app.free

ma.secure.bn

com.huawei.mediacontroller

org.telegram.plus

com.devexpert.climate

ru.bristol.bristol_app

com.sec.android.app.samsungapps

org.telegram.messenger

com.gamegou.soccer

com.relationship.mylove

re.sova.5

com.namaztime

com.allgoritm.youla

com.vtosters.lite

com.mixerbox.tomodoko

com.google.android.apps.maps

com.taxsee.taxsee

drug.vokrug

com.coloros.alarmclock

com.launcher.brgame

com.mxtech.videoplayer.advert

com.yandex.browser

com.tencent.ig

com.huawei.contacts

ru.yandex.uber

com.grif.vmp

us.ultrasurf.cellular.ultrasurf

com.waplog.social

com.huawei.well being

com.miui.gallery

org.findmykids.little one

ru.rt.smarthome

sg.bigo.stay

com.onlyspark

com.boombitgames.DrivingSchoolParking

app.nicegram

cn.xiaofengkj.fitpro

ru.euphoria.moozza.new

com.cuttosave.tobehero.ropepuzzle

com.sec.android.daemonapp

com.google.android.apps.pictures

com.kiloo.subwaysurf

free.zaycev.internet

com.hmdglobal.app.digital camera

com.samsung.android.dynamiclock

ru.vk.retailer

com.dywx.larkplayer

com.pinterest

com.vk.love

com.osp.app.signin

com.samsung.android.app.smartcapture

internet.hubalek.android.reborn.beta

ru.farpost.dromfilter

ru.dublgis.dgismobile

ru.stoloto.cellular

com.nemo.vidmate

com.babilonm.app

com.samsung.android.lool

com.android.dialer

com.web.velocity.meter.lite

com.twitter.android

free.tube.premium.superior.tuber

com.avito.android

com.android.suppliers.contacts

ru.fotostrana.sweetmeet

ru.cardsmobile.mw3

com.soundcloud.android

com.android.ztescreenshot

com.heytap.browser

ir.ilmili.telegraph

com.android.messaging

com.gbox.com.instagram.android

ru.gdemoideti.little one

com.truecaller

cc.coolline.consumer.professional

com.samsung.android.oneconnect

com.chess

com.ihappydate

com.huawei.systemmanager

com.instagram.android

com.dts.freefireth

com.android.settings

com.viber.voip

com.livescore

ru.okay.android

com.snapchat.android

com.huami.watch.hmwatchmanager

com.phrase.grid.problem

com.whatsapp.w4b

com.iMe.android

com.evermatch

com.android.merchandising

com.discord

com.eapoker.durak.worldwide

com.vkontakte.android

com.google.android.gm

com.gbox.com.google.android.youtube

com.xiaomi.uncover

ru.cian.primary

pedometer.steptracker.
calorieburner.stepcounter

steptracker.healthandfitness.
walkingtracker.pedometer

com.beermoneygames.demolition3

org.thunderdog.challegram

com.google.android.apps.nbu.recordsdata

com.android.systemui

com.transsion.batterylab

org.telegram.mdgram

com.vk.im

com.android.chrome

org.telegram.messenger.net

com.instagram.lite

television.twitch.android.app

android

com.axlebolt.standoff2

ru.yandex.searchplugin

mates.denied.bend

com.shaiban.audioplayer.mplayer

ru.yandex.yandexmaps

com.toto.pwapp

marshall.threesome.vibrator

video.like

ru.yandex.weatherplugin

belarus.topless.revenue

com.ss.android.ugc.trill

temper.cove.humidity

ru.tander.magnit

com.tblenovo.lewea

com.rockbite.zombieoutpost

com.isharing.isharing

com.google.android.apps.magazines

com.heytap.market

org.vidogram.lite

videoeditor.videorecorder.screenrecorder

com.samsung.android.incallui

com.yingsheng.hayloufun

com.nektome.chatruletka.voice

com.oplus.video games

ru.tsk.ftc.bender.qpay

com.miui.securitycenter

com.coloros.gamespaceui

tech.jm

com.yandex.searchapp

app.supply.getcontact

com.sec.android.app.digital camera

com.fb.orca

com.devuni.flashlight

present.dairy.measurements

com.android.contacts

com.xiaomi.mi_connect_service

com.taxsee.driver

com.coinmarketcap.android

com.vkmp3mod.android

mans.auto.cellphone.cooling.grasp

ru.dnevnik.app

com.google.android.gms

com.miui.participant

com.lenovo.anyshare.gps

com.samsung.android.app.ideas

org.aka.messenger

com.sec.android.app.myfiles

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Constructing an AI Picture Recognition App Utilizing Google Gemini and SwiftUI

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Constructing the App UI

Picture Evaluation and Object Recognition

Abstract

The faucet-estry of threats concentrating on Hamster Kombat gamers

What’s Hamster Kombat?

Risk evaluation

Android threats

Ratel spyware and adware

Pretend web sites

Home windows threats

C++ purposes

Go purposes

Python purposes

Conclusion

IoCs

Information

Community

Code-signing certificates

MITRE ATT&CK methods

Appendix

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Who’s Justin Baldoni and does his solid hate him?

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Don’t Fear Darling is written throughout this scandal

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